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NOTES.
LAw SCHOOL-ORDER OF TIlE COIF-At the annual meeting of
the University of Pennsylvania Chapter of the Order of the Coif
on April 7, 1916, the following members of the Class of 1916 were
elected to membership:
Heath Steck Clark Louis E. Levinthal
Edward E. Eisenstein Lemuel Braddock Schofield
Befijamin M. Kline Paul Connor Wagner
Richard Hay Woolsey
APPEAL-HAS A BOARD OF CENSORS TIE FINAL DECISIO AS
TO TIlE PROPRIETY OF A 'MOTION PICTURE FILM ?-Because of the
extension of the domain of administrative boards and quasi-judicial
tribunals, a recent decision I in an appeal from an order of the Penn-
(731)
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!!ylvania Board of Censors of Motion Pictures is of importance
aside from the particular subject matter involved.
It was contended that, under the statute creating the Board,
the censors had the sole and exclusive authority to determihe the
propriety of the films, and that on appeal the court was limited to
an examination of the regularity of procedure and use of discretion
by the censors.* The court held that upon appeal the wvhole matter
was before the court de novo, to be examined and tried regardless
of the former examination.
At common law an appeal in the technical sense as meaning a
trial de novo, did not exist.' So in the absence of statutory au-
thorization no appeal can be taken to a judicial tribunal from the
decisions and orders of administratie'e bodies, such as county
boards.' Furthermore, in matters of police regulation, when de-
cisions resting on questions of public safety are entrusted to an
administrative board, the right of appeal to a judicial tribunal need
not be conferred.- The establishment of a state board of motion
picture censors with power to prohibit the exhibition of films of
which it does not approve is a valid exercise of the police power.
6
It is apparent then that a legislature need not grant an appeal from
such a board of censors- and that unless expressly granted it does
-not exist.
On account of the vario* s meanings attached to the word
"appeal," the mere use of the word in a statute furnishes no certain
guide to its precise meaning and effect." The particular statute must
'Franklin Film Mf'g Corp'n, 25 Dist. R. 219 (Pa. xgi6).
'Act of May i5, 1915. P. L. 534.
"Sec. 2'6.-If any elimination or disapproval of a film . . . is ap-
pealed from, such film. will be promptly re-examined, in the presence of
such person, by two or more members of the board, and the same finally
approved or disapproved promptly after such re-examination, with the
right of appeal from the decision of the board to the Court of Common
Pleas of the proper county."
'Evansville & T. H. R. Co. v. Terre Haute, 161 Ind. 26 (igo3); Fouse
v. Vandervort, 30 W. Va. 327 (1887).
'Canal Co. v. Bright. 8 Col. 144 (1&4) ; Bridges v. Clay County, 57 Miss.
2"2 (1879) ; in re Searles, 127 Pac. 9o2 (Mont. 1912).
Where no appeal is provided. ce'!tiorari or other remedy is open to
injured parties to review the proceedings. State Board of Com'rs of Polk
County, 87 NMinn. 325 (1902).
For cases on different kinds of quasi-judicial officers, see Mechem:
Law of Public Officers, §§ 636-643.
'Curran v. Delano, 235 Pa. 478 (1912); Plymouth Coal Co. v. Penn-
sylvania, 232 U. S. 531 (1914).
'Mutual Film Co. v. Ohio Industrial Commission, 215 Fed. 138 (914),
affirmed in 236 U. S. 23o (19). Mutual Film Co. v. Hodges, Gov. of
Kan.. 236 U. S. 248 (i91s).
'Block v. Chicago, 239 Ill. 251 (igo9) ; Mutual Film Corp'n v. Breitinger,
250 Pa. 225 (1915).
' Especially is this true in Pennsylvania. The Act of May 9, 1889, § 1,
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be construed in order to determine the import of the term.9 Re-
sort must be had to the general policy of the law and to reasons
drawn by analogy and from the practical consequences of apply-
ing one interpretation or another. The principal case furnishes an
illuminating example of this method.' 0  Statutes giving the right
of appeal are liberally construed. 1
The practice in "appeals" from quasi-judicial tribunals seems
to favor a trial de novo by the court. Such is the general rule on
an appeal from an order or decision of a county board."2 In Con-
necticut, an appeal by a street railway from municipal authorities
to the railroad commissioners, in a proceeding to locate a road, car-
ries up the whole proceeding for review de novo," and the same
is true of an appeal to the court from a decision of the commission-
ers. 4 Under acts providing for appeals from certain quasi-judicial
tribunals to courts, which statutes neither prescribed any course of
procedure by, nor limited the power of, the appellate tribunal on
such an appeal, it has been held that the legislature intended to con-
fer upon the court jurisdiction to try and determine de novo all the
issues of fact and law originally presented to the board.' The
P. L. i58, provides that all appellate proceedings heretofore taken by writ
of error, appeal, or certiorari, shall hereafter be taken in proceedings to be
called an appeal.
This Act does not extend the right or alter the modes of review, but
merely changes the names of the former modes. Shoup v. Shoup, 205 Pa.
22 (i9o3) ; Katherine Water Co., 32 Pa. Super. 94 (Igo6).
See Monaghan: Pennsylvania Appellate Practice, § 48, Right of Review
in Statutory Proceedings; lb. § 182 (3), Appeal Defined.
'Carnall v. Crawford County. ix Ark. 6o4 (851); State v. Jackson-
ville Terminal Co., 41 Fla. 363 (1899).
"Supra, note i. Barratt, P. J.-"Thus the technical meaning of the
word 'appeal,'. the literary construction of the sentence, and the reference
to the Common Pleas, as well as the history of the statute, all point alike
to a retrial. The magnitude of the interests involved, both property and
otherwise, indicate the same intention on the part of the legislature."
"Snyder v. Circuit Judge, 8o Mich. si C 089o); Stephens v. Cherokee
Nation, x74 U. S. 445 (1898); 2 Lewis's Sutherland: Statutory Construc-
tion, § 717.
"Mahoney v. Shoshone County, 8 Idaho 375 (1902); Myers v. Gibson,
152 Ind. 5oo (898).
Cf. Goodnow: Principles of Administrative Law, p. 395: "Courts will
not review the determination of assessors as to the value of the property,
where such.assessors have had jurisdiction and have applied right legal
principles." Citing, McCrillis v. Mansfield. 64 Me. igs (1875); Houston
County Com'rs v. Jessup, 22 Minn.. 552 (1876).
"Hartford v. Hartford St. Rwy. Co., 75 Conn. 471 (1903).
"Waterbury's Appeal, 78 Conn. 222 (x9O).
"City of Rockford v. Compton. TI5 Ill. App. 4o6 (i9o4),-appeal from
board of fire and police commissioners upon removal of member of force;
McMillan v. Board of County Com'rs, 93 Minn. 16 (go4),-appeal in pro-
ceeding for construction of a drainage ditch.
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reasons applied in the construction of those statutes apply with equal
force to the principal case.
R.K.D.
NoTE.-Since the above was written the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has reversed the decision of the Court of Common Pleas. (April 17, 1916.)"
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-PROIIIB-
ITIVE TAX ON TRADING STAMps-The general use of trading stamps
and coupons in connection with retail sales has been productive of
considerable regulative legislation, the validity of which after fre-
quent review in the state courts has now for the first time been
considered by the Supreme Court of the United States. Twenty-
three states have attempted either to prohibit or to impose license
fees which are in effect prohibitive taxes upon the selling or use of
trading stamps and coupons. Similar legislation has been enacted
for the District of Columbia and the Territory of Hawaii.
In the state courts, the overwhelming weight of authority has
condemned these statutes as an arbitrary discrimination against a
legitimate business and as an unwarrantable interference with the
liberty of the citizen, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.,
In the state cases it has frequently been declared that the use of
trading stamps and similar devices is but a noyel means of ad-
vertising, not essentially different from other law ful methods of
attracting custom; and that there, is no reasonable basis for select-
ing this particular mode of advertising to be prohibited, or taxed
out of existence.2 Time and again have these decisions upheld the
legitimacy of the trading stamp enterprise, and asserted that as
there is nothing in the business detrimental to the public health,
morals, safety, or welfare, the state can neither prohibit it directly
" In an opinion by Mr. Justice Von Moschzisker, the court said: "A
careful reading of the statute convinces us it was never contemplated that
the Courts of Common Pleas were to be constantly called upon to permit
moving picture reels to be produced before them, and sit as supercensors
thereof, in order to review the decisions of the administrative body created
by the act. The evident intent was to grant a right of appeal to the Com-
mon Pleas Court so that tribunal could correct any arbitrary or oppressive
orders which the Board of Censors might make, and nothing more; in
other words, that the. court might reverse the censors when the latter
were guilty of abuse of discretion. This is the ordinary rule to which,
on appeal, even this court restricts itself in reviewing an exercise of dis-
cretion, particularly of administrative officals."
I Ex parte Drexel, 147 Cal. 763 (;go5); State v. Casphre, 1i5 Md. 7
(1911):. Sperry & 1-1. Co. v. Owensboro. 15i Ky. 389 (1912). The lower
federal courts are in accord. Cottrell v. Sperry & H. Co., 227 Fed. 256
(191s).
'lHewin v. Atlanta, 121 Ga. 723 (i9o4) ; State v. Dodge, -6 Vt. 197 (z9o4).
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under color of the police power nor accomplish the same result
indirectly by the imposition of excessive license taxes.
3
The United States Supreme Court, however, vhen finally con-
fronted with the problem, with full realization of the gravity of
the question, and complete appreciation of the great body of state
authority, has now rendered a contrary opinion. The occasion was
three cases in each of which merchants issuing trading stamps or
premium tokens attacked the validity of state laws imposing obvi-
ously prohibitive license fees on such tokens. All three cases were
considered together and decided on the same day, the decision,
being, as stated, that the statutes are valid.
4
For the purpose of the decision, the court treats the statutes
as in effect direct prohibitions upon the issuance of trading stamps
and coupons. Thus considered, the argument for their validity
would be that they were passed under a lawful exercise of the
police power of the state; and the main argument in rebuttal would
be that they violated the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which
forbids any state to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, or to deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. It is fundamental to
say that a valid exercise of the police power is not controlled or
in any way affected by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment ;' but the state cannot, under the guise of police regulations,
arbitrarily invade private 'property or personal rights, or arbitrarily
discriminate between individuals or classes.6
Whether a law is beneficial to the public health, safety or
morals is primarily and fundanentally for the legislature to de-
termine, and the courts have nothing to do with the .isdom, policy,
or expediency of the laws passed under the police power.? But
though the discretion of the legislature is very large, it is not final
and conclusive; the courts have power to determine whether the
law has a real and substantial relation to the public safety, health,
or welfare, and whether it operates or tends in some real degree
to promote or. sequre these objects.8
The courts, however, are loth to condemn a regulation, ostensi-
bly police, as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, and will not
do so except where absolutely necessary. If it is possible to find
'Denver v. Frucauff, 39 Colo. 2o (igo6); N ebraska v. Sperry & H. Co.,
94 Neb. 785 (1913) ; and-cases supra, notes i and z
'Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co.; Tanner v. Little; Pitney v. Vash-
ington (U. S. S. C., March 6, 1916).
'Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 0885); Powell v. Penna., 127 U. S.
678 (1888).
'Lawton v. Steele, 152 U, S. 133 (1894); Yick 'Wo v. Hopkins, i18 U.
S. 356 (1886).
" Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 62-3 (1887).
'Chicago, B. & 0. Rwy. Co. v. Illinois, -oo U. S. 561 (x9o6).
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any reasonable basis for the classification made by the legislature,
the courts will refuse to declare it discriminatory; and likewise if
the due process clause is invoked, the courts will do their best to
uphold the statute, if they can possibly find that it bears any reason-
able relation to the public welfare.
It was avowedly with this attitude of mind that the United
States Supreme Court examined the trading stamp laws. Mr. Jus-
tice McKenna says in delivering the opinion of the court: "It is
established that a distinction in legislation is not arbitrary, if any
state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it,
and the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was
enacted must be assured.'- This language is extremely significant,
indicating as it does that the court will make an active effort to
inagine some reasonable basis for the law, whether or not that
basis is proved actually to exist.
Viewing the p~roblem from that angle, the court felt itself able
to find a sufficient difference between a business in which trading
stamps were used and one in which they were not used, to meet
the objection that the statutes were a denial of the equal pro-
tection of the laws; and in answer to the contention that the acts
unlawfully infringed the business liberty of the complainants in
violation of the due process clause, the court declared that it was
reasonably possible to assume such deleterious effects arising from
the use of trading stamps as to justify the statutes under the police
power of the states. It thought that trading stamps or coupons are
something more than advertising, but that even regarding their use
as a means of advertising, the difference between a business in
which coupons are used, and one in which they are not used, is
pronounced, and that "the legislation which regards .the difference
is not arbitrary within the rulings of the cases".9  The court also
thought that the persistent effort of the various legislatures to wipe
out the trading stamp business, exhibited since i88o, must be due
to some justifiable feeling that the business is undesirable. The
court apparently felt that though it might not be possible to point out
any definite evil in the use of coupons, yet the constant recur-
rence of these anti-coupon laws must indicate some such underlying
detriment.
It must be admitted that there is a good deal of force in this
reasoning, and it is quite possible that, as stated by the court, the
apparent giving of something for nothing by means of trading
stamps or the like may tempt the public to unwise expenditures.10
'Per McKenna, J., rendering the opinion of the court.
""They rely upon something else than the article sold. They tempt
by a promise of a value greater than that article and apparently not rep-
resented in its price, and it hence may he thought that thus by an appeal
to cupidity hire to improyidence. This may not be called in an exact
sense a 'lottery'; may not be called 'gaming'; it may. however, be considered
NOTES
But in these cases the Suprcme Court has clearly shown its
intention to uphold a law in spite of the great weight of other
authority, where it is in any way possible to find a reasonable
ground for so doing. Viewed in that light, the decision seems
proper.
E.E.
CONTRACTS-VALIDI'rY-OUSTI NG TIlE JURISDICTION OR" LIM-
ITING TIlE POWER OF TIIE COURTS---It is universally conceded that
parties to a contract may stipulate in many ways the rules of law for
any legal proceedings to which they may become parties, which not
only will bind them, but which the courts are bound to enforce.'
Thus an agreement that a period less than tfiat fixed by the statute of
limitations shall be a bar to any action springing from the contract
is valid.2 Also that the action is not pursued in the particular way
provided by the agreement of the parties is a valid defence to a
suit at law brought in a different manner.3
But although the courts will allow this limited interference with
their jurisdiction, they will not give validity to a contract that pro-
vides that neither party shall resort to the courts. 4 In Doyle v.
Insurance Company,- the Supreme Court of the United-States re-
fused to sanction a contract to refrain from resorting to the courts
6f the United States.
The question then arises: Will the courts sustain an agree-
ment to sue in only one certain court? This question has been an-
swered in the negative in the recent case of Nashia River Paper
Company v. Haninerville Paper Company,0 where the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts held that a stipulatioP in the contract that
no actioi should be maintained under the contract in any state
court or federal court other than the state court of Pennsylvania,
was unenforcible and would, not preclude the maintenance of an
action in Massachusetts. The argument to sue in only a certain
court is a stipulation concerning the remedy, which is created and
regulated by law and therefore cannot be changed by the parties.*
Although this mode of reasoning causes no difficulty- when ap-
as having the seduction and evil of such, and whether it has may be a matter
of inquiry, a matter of inquiry and of judgment that it is finally *ithin
the power of the legislature to make." Per McKenna, J.
'Matter of N. Y. R. R. Co., 98 N. Y. 447 (1885).
'Brown v. Insurance Co., 24 Ga. 97 (i858).
'Insurance Co. v. Candle Co., 31 Pa. 448 (7855).
'Knorr v. Bates, 35 N. Y. Supp. io6o (1895).
Z94 U. S. 535 (1876).
61 N. E. 678 (Mass. 1916).
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plied to the facts of the particular case, at first glance, it seems to
raise a serious doubt as to the soundness of those decisions which
uphold a stipulation that disputes arising on a contract shall be
referred to an arbitrator, whose decision shall be final. As the
right to sue in any court is a question of remedy, it is submitted
that the right of going before an arbitrator is also a question of
remedy. But a close survey of the cases will show that the ap-
parent inconsistency does not exist. While as a general rule courts
may be said to enforce an agreement to refer to arbitrators yet they
will not enforce the contract unless the dispute refers only to
questions of fact.7 If the stipulation is that disputes as to ques-
tions of law, or as to the legal rights of the parties under the con-
tract, shall be submitted to a referee, it is invalid.s As courts of
law determine the legal rights of the parties as well as the questions
of fact,, it may be readily seen that a contract to sue in only a
certain court is in effect an agreement to refer all questions of
law to a certain arbitrator.
It is firmly settled in Pennsylvania that agreements to refer
disputes of facts to arbitrators will be upheld, provided the power
to pass upon the subject matter in dispute, is clearly given to the
arbitrator by the terms of the agreement.9 In Ruch v. York,10
Mr. Justice IMestrezat said, "the parties to a building contract
may legally provide therein that disputes arising out of the contract
shall be submitted for decision to the architect, and that his con-
clusion or judgment shall be a final adjudication of the questions
submitted. Such submission may include the power to determine
the right of the parties to liquidated damages under the terms of
the contract."
From this broad language it would seem that the parties to a
contract may waive all right of action respecting any dispute which
may arise and thereby accomplish the complete abrogation of the
authority of the courts. In none of these cases, however, was the
court asked to enforce an agreement to arbitrate a dispute involving
a question of law. Moreover in the earlier case of Mentz v. h:sur-
ance Company," MNfr. Justice Sharswood said, "It is not in the
power of the parties to a contract to otist the courts of their juris-
diction. The arbitrator cannot be made a judge of law and facts."
From this apparent conflict of opinion it is difficult to deduce
any distinctly established rule in Pennsylvania upon the subject. It
is submitted, however, that if in enforcing a contract to refer to
'Sanitary Dist. v. McMahon, uIo Ill. App. 5To (19o3); Hager v. Shuck,
I m Ky. 574 (19oY.
" Bannon v. Jackson, 121 Tenn. 381 (19o8); Barlow v. United States,
184 U. S. 123 (19oI).
'Reilly v. Rodef Sholem Congregation, 243 Pa. 528 (1914).
'23M Pa. 36 (1912).
79 Pa. 478 (1875).
NOTES
arbitration a question of law is squarely brought before the Su-
premle Court of Pennsylvania, it will follow the opinion of Justice
Sharswood and refuse to give validity to such an agreement.'
2
G.F. D.
COURTS-JURISDICTION IN MOOT Cszrs-While the general
principle that courts should refuse to assume jurisdiction in moot
cases has long been recognized,' little attention has been given to the
formulation of rules for determining whether or not a given
case is moot within the rule. This is due perhaps to the fact that
the refusal of the court to assume jurisdiction in such a case is
entirely discretionary, there being no legal prohibition against the
decision of such an issue, and also to the further circumstance that
the very nature of the subject necessitates to a great extent the
decision of each case upon its peculiar facts, and to some degree
minimizes the value of precedent. The courts have, however, in
the absence of any legal obligation, refrained from deciding such
cases with remarkable uniformity, and from their opinions a few
general principles may be collected.
At the beginning, moot cases fall ilito two natural classes. The
first class includes those cases in which the situation upon which
the court is isked to give an opinion is a purely fictitious or hypo-
thetical one, in the sense that it at no time existed in actuality.
In the second group are those cases where facts raising an issue
entirely proper for decision existed when the suit was commenced,
but where it appears, upon the decision of the case on appeal, that
by the alteration or discontinuance of the situation upon which the
issue was founded, the case, once real, has become moot.
Under the first group are those cases in which a mere colorable
dispute is created between parties whose interests are not adverse,
to obtain the opinion of the court upon a question of law which
it is to their interest to knowP2 and also those in which an issue
equally fictitious is based upon an assumed breach of an existing
contract or an assumed contest of a will.3 While it has been
urged in such cases that the instrument as ain existing document
should be construed it seems clear that so long as the issue itself is
fictitious the fact that documents upon which it is based may have
"'This was so held by the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in Mitchell v. Dougherty, go Fed. 639 (z898).
'Cox v. Phillips, Lee Temp. Iiardwickce 237 (1736); Lord v. Veazie,
8 How. 251 (U. S. i85o).
'Smith v. Junction Rwy. Co., 29 Ind. r46 (if.i).
-Collins v. Collins, 19 Ohio St. 468 (1869), the court refused to con-
strue a will whbre no trust was involved. In New Orleans, etc., Rwy. v.
Linehan Ferry Co., 1o4 La. 53 ('oo), the court refused to construe a
contract until an actual issue should arise.
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a physical and not merely a hypothetical existence cannot be ma-
terial. In such cases a construction of the document is uniformly
refused.
Often the public interest attached to a particular question
would seem to constitute a persuasive argument to justify its de-
cision, but even in such cases jurisdiction is declined. In a recent
case before the Supreme Court of the United States 4 the con-
stitutional authority of the Secretary of War to make an order that
upon any declaration of war the members of the national guard
might be directed by the President to proceet to any point whether
witlhi or without the United States, wa's questioned. An issue
would hardly arise in the matter until such an emergency as would
make the remedy of judicial determination inappropriate. The
court held that it could not be compelled to construe such orders
for the members "notwithstandhig their laudable feeling of deep
interest in the general subject," and declined to give an opinion.'
There is a class of cases often ol)jected to as moot without
success, which, although they are clearly not to be considered moot
cases, show very plainly the line of demarcation between a moot
question and a real issue. Where a statute lays down a rule or
prescribes a penalty, especially where the penalty is payable to the
party aggrieved, a person often places himself in a position to
invite its violation to make a "test case" or to obtain financial
enrichment. A not uncommon form of such a statute is one pro-
viding a penalty for charging excessive fares. Whether the courts
allow or refuse recovery under such a statute in the case of a
person who becomes a passenger for the sole purpose of receiving
pecuniary advantage from an anticipated violation,6 such refusal
or allowance is based upon considerations of public policy and statu-
tory construction, and not upon the ground that the question is
moot. These cases emphasize the true criterion for determining
the existence of a moot question, namely, the presence or absence
of an adverse interest. Wherever there exists, as in this latter
tVle of cases, an interest truly adverse on the part of the.claim-
ant, the question cannot be objected to as moot.
'Lieutenant-Colonel Stearns v. Brigadier-General Wood, 236 U. S. 75
(1915).
'Many unique and interesting cases arise under this head. In Bardon
v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co.. 22 D. R. 942 (Pa. 194), the counsel for the
plaintiff, after a verdict in his favor, sought to contest the trial court's
refusal to grant a general exception to its charge, by an appeal. The court
dismissed the case without decision as purely academic.
'In Nicholson v. 'ew York City Rwy. Co., iz8 App. Div. 858 (N. Y.
ioo7), recovery was denied under these facts. In Adami v. Union R. R.
Co.. 21 R. 1. 24 (o,%M). recovery was allowed. The New York case denied
recovery, not because the question was moot, but because they held, as a
matter of statutory construction, that the statute was intended to apply to
bona fide passengers only.
NOTES
In the second type of moot cases where a situation giving rise
to an actual issue has at one time existed, but where the actuality
of the situation has been removed by events intervening during
the pendency of an appeal, the general tendency of the appellate
courts is to treat the case as though it had been fictitious ab initio
and to refuse to entertain jurisdiction.- It seems obvious that in
the ordinary case the fact that it has became moot before it reaches
the appellate court clearly justifies the refusal to take jurfsdiction
and that such cases are not to be distinguished in principle from
those in which the issue has been at all times fictitious.
It may well become material, however, in detenining whether
when a case has been argued before the appellate court and where
between the argument and the decision by that court the question
becomes moot,8 the court should refuse to give a decision. This de-
pends largely upon the fundamental reason for which jurisdiction
in moot cases is declined. If, as is generally stated, the ground
is that the court's time should be devoted to the determination of
actual controversies and not wasted in the consideration of hypo-
thetical cases, the case should eveni under these circumstances be
dismissed. If, on the other hand, the reason is that a moot case is
likely to be argued and considered less thoroughly or that if colz
lusively brought, the presentation of the merits of one side may
purposely be made inadequate, thereby paving the way for the
establishment of unsound and dangerous precedents, the latter ob-
jection at least is absent where the case has not until after the
conclusion of the argument become moot. In Burke! v. Dunlap,9
where this precise situation was presented, the court, while empha-
sizing the fact that parties could not, by a settlement after argu-
ment, deprive the court of its right to decide the question if it so
desired, said that of the alternate courses the dismissal of the ap-
peal was to be preferred.
Familiar instances of this type of moot cases are those in-
volving the validity of elections where the dismissal of an appeal
on the ground that the question has become moot often leaves un-
redressed what has been a valid grievance. In James v. Jlontaguelo
a voter sought to enjoin the canvassing of the votes at a certain
election, alleging that the section of the Virginia constitution-under
'In Faust v. Cairns, 242 Pa. 15 (r93), where a quarantine was re-
moved while an appeal from a refusal to enjoin it was pending, the appeal
was dismissed. See also Cuteomp v. Utt, 6o Ia. 156 (1882); Cheong Ah
May v. United States. 113 U. S. 216 (1,85). So also where a permit, the
refusal of which has been appealed, would have expired. Security Life
Ins. Co. v. Prewitt; 20o U. S. 446 (igo5).
'Where it appears in the cnurse of the argument that the case has be-
come moot, the appeal will be dismissed. Bucks Stove Company-v. American
Federation of Labor, 219 U. S. 58, (1910).
'72 S. E. 65 (Ga. rgsx).
24 194 U. S. 147 (19O3).
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which it was held was void in that it was aimed at the disenfran-
chisement of colored voters. The petition was dismissed by the
Circuit Court and when the case reached the Supreme Court on
appeal the candidates elected were already in the I-louse of Repre-
sentatives. The court said that the thing sought to be prohibited
had been done and could not be undone by the court, and refused to
take jurisdiction.""
Under the second type of moot questions situations frequently
occur which may justify the application of different principles.
Thus it may be that although pending the appeal the question has
become moot due to intervening circumstances, the abatement or
cessation of the alleged illegal situation is of dubious or uncertain
permanency. Such a situation is well illustrated in United Slates
v. ltambury-1Inierican Comnpany,12 a recent decision by the Supreme
Court. A suit had been commenced by the United States against
certain steanship companies in 191i for an alleged violation of
the Anti-Trust Act of i89o. The Supreme Court took judicial
notice of the European war as a result of which the question had
become moot, and refused to entertain jurisdiction. The case of
United States v. Prince Line," decided a year earlier in a district
court, where under facts practically identical with those of the
princilal case the court assumed jurisdiction, was expressly disap-
proved. In that case the court after admitting that the war had
necessitated a dissolution of the alleged illegal agreement and
"turned this investigation into an autopsy instead of a determina-
tion of live issues," proceeded to decide the controversy on its
merits.
It was urged in the principal case that in view of the proba-
bility that at the cessation of war the alleged illegal combination
would be resumed, there should be a determination of the case
on its merits to preclude such an attempt. In United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight AIssociatio, 14 a bill to dissolve an associa-
tion alleged to be illegal having been dismissed by the lower courts,
"See also Richardson v. McChcsney, 218 U. S. 487 (1910). In Wash-
ington an exception to the general rule is made in the case of suits to'en-
join certain contracts for public work. Thus the court refused to dismiss
an appeal from an order denying an injunction forbidding public officials
from making a contract for public work, even though the city had pending
the appeal made compliance with the injunction impossible by entering into
such a contract, under which the work had actually been perfornied. Graff
v. City of Tacoma, i2i" Pac. 250 (Wash. 1go); Green v. O'Kanogan County,
iii l'ac. 2-6 (\\Wash. i91o). It has been held in one case that satisfaction
of a judgment entered against the appellant after his appeal had been
perfected but before hearing, did not justify the dismissal of the appeal
without his consent. Arnold v. Pike, 143 N. V. 662 (Wis. i913). This case
appears clearly contra to the general view.
"36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 212 (196) ; 239 U. S. 446.
"220-o Fed. 230 (191s).
3 166 U. S. -go (1896).
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before the argument on an appeal to the Supreme Court the as-
sociation dissolved voluntarily, and when the case came before the
appellate court it was urged that it was then moot. The court held
that it was not by this voluntary dissolution deprived of the right
to determine the rights of the parties and restrain future viola-
tions. The court in the principal case distinguished it from this
earlier decision on the ground that in the earlier case the dissolu-
tion was purely voluntary and. nothing prevented an immediate
resumption of the illegal combination, whil.e in the latter case the
dissolution was due to events wholly beyond the control of the
parties.
That the court in the Freight Association case made an ex-
ception to the general rule in certain of the second type of moot
cases and assuned jurisdiction in a case purely moot, is undeniable,
and the soundness of the exception is beyond question.15 To hold
that a defendant combination which had succeeded in the court
below could dissolve the old association and immediately form a
new one pending the appeal and thereby practically oust the juris-
diction of the Supreme Court by rendering every appeal moot would
be such an obvious travesty on justice that there is little wonder
that it was not couitenanced.
It is suggested, however, that to predicate a further distinction
upon the involuntary character of the dissolution is more ques-
tionable. From the standpoint of the persons aggrieved by the
alleged illegal combination, whether it be the public or an individual,
the permanency of the interrupting influence and not its involun-
tary nature'is the rhaterial consideration. While it is true that a
cause such as war is beyond the control of the defendants, there
is no more assurance of the permanency of the interruption in that
case than in the case of voluntary dissolution. An early termina-
tion of the war would permit a Tesumption of the arrangement
complained of in the same manner as though the dissolution had
been a voluntary act. The concern of the injured party is not
whether the dissolution is voluntary or involuntary, but whether
there is for any reason an assurance that it will not be resumed.
Having once crossed the line and properly taken jurisdiction
in this class of cases, the true criterion for the assumption of juris-
diction should, it is submitted, lie in the probable permanency of
the cessation, and not in the voluntary or involuntary character of
the dissolving cause.
B.M.K.
"' Another apparent exception is made in the case of orders of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, which are "continuing" in their nature. It
has been held that the mere fact that the period of their validity under the
statute has expired pending the appeal, will not prevent the assumption of
jurisdiction. Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. I. C. C., 2i9 U. S. 498 (igio).
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MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-
CONCLUSIVENESS OF DECISION OF THE BOARD--A primary object of
all workmen's compensation legislation is the speedy and final set-
tlement of claims for injuries due to industrial accidents. To se-
cure this end it is absolutely necessary that where the administra-
tion of such a law is placed in the hands of a commission or board,
its awards and decisions should be as far as possible the last ex-
pressions required. Under all the acts the decisions of the board
may be appealed from because of errors of law. IHow far is the
finding of the board final as to a question of fact?
The recent case of Uphoff v. Industrial Board of Illinois," pre-
sents the question of the board's finding of a jurisdictional fact.
There the board found that the employer was as a matter of fact
one of a certain class included within the operation of the statute.
On appeal the court held that the decision of the board was only
binding when it was acting within its powers, and that it had no
power to apply the act to persons or corporations who are not sub-
ject to its provisions and that if it did so the remedy was in the
courts.
The board is generally considered as an administrative body,
endowed with certain quasi-judicial powers.2  The members are
not judicial officers but perform a great many of the duties usually
performed by such officers, such as administering oaths, holding
hearings, taking testimony, examining evidence, making rulings
of law and findings of fact, and rendering decisions. The Massa-
chusetts courts consider that they are bound by the same general
rules of law iin the performance of these duties that govern judicial
officers in the discharge of the same duties. To that extent the
findings of fact of the board are considered as of the same weight
and effect as those of a judge without a jury, and are.not to be
set aside if there was any evidence upon which they could have been
made.3 When all the evidence is reported it may become a question
of law whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant the findings ;4
but where no evidence is reported it cannot be said as a matter of
law that the finding was not warranted." And questions as to the
correctness of the board's rulings as to the admission or exclusion
Iii N. E. 128 (Ill. 1916).
'Pigeon's Case, 216 Mass. 51 (1913); Appeal of Bond Co., 93 Atl.
245 (Conn. 1915); Reck v. X\hittlesberger, 148"N. W. 247 (Mich. 1914);
Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327 (1911); Poccardi v. Pub. Serv. Comm.,84 S. E. 242 (W. Va. 1915).
'Pigeon's Case, 216 Mass. 51 (1913) : Diaz's Case. 217 Mass. 36 (1914);
Burn's Case, 218 Mass. 8 (1914); In re McPhee. 1o9 N. E. 633 (Mass. r915);
In re Doherty, 1o9 N. E. 887 (Mass. 195); In re Savage; xio N. E. 283
(Mass. 1915).
'Herrick's Case, 217 Mass. M1 (1914); Buckley's Case, 218 Mass. 354
(1914); Fisher's Case, 220 Mass. $8i (1915).
•Septimo's Case, 219 Mass. 430 (1914) ; Bentley's Case. 217 .Ma.,s. '9 (1914).
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of evidence will be considered on appeal, but there will be no
reversal of the decree for error in this respect unless the sub-
stantial rights of the parties appear to have been affected.8
Other jurisdictions have reached practically the same result,7
a!though the courts sometimes give different reasons for their de-
cisions. Thus Wisconsin courts consider it to be jurisdictional
error, which is always subject to review by the courts, if there has
been a. clear violation of the law in reaching the result attained
by the board, such as acting without evidence when evidence is re-
quired, or making a decision contrary to all the evidence.8 In Con-
necticut the Compensation Commissioner is regarded as an executive
officer purely. There can be no trial dc novo on the facts, but there
may be an appeal from his award on the ground that it is an original
application to the court to exercise its judicial power in respect
to acts done by an administrative tribunal in excess or abuse of its
powers.9
The finality of the board's findings of fact extends, of course,
to ultimate facts, that is, to conclusions of fact determined by the
board from the evidentiary facts proved.' 0 To hold otherwise
would be to defeat the very purpose of the act and would result in
a volume of unnecessary litigation and useless appeals. Such facts,
however, must be based on competent evidence. While workinen's
compensation boards are not usually bound by technical rules -of
evidence their awards cannot be based on mere guess, supposition
or conjecture." As stated before, the court may pass on the suffi-
ciency, or legality, of the evidence.. But it is not within the province
'Pigeon's Case, 216 Mass. 5! (1913).
'The findings of fact are final when supported by evidence: Smith v.
Ind. Comm. 147 Pac. 6oo (Cal. T915); Hills v. Blair, T48 N. NV. 243 (Mich.
1914); Redfield v. Ins. Co., i5o N. . .362 (Mich. 1915); Powley v.
Vivian, z54 N. Y. Supp. 426 (1915); Plass. v. Railroad; 155 N. Y. Supp.
854 (1915); Fuel Co. v. Ind. Comm., i5o N. AV. 998 (Wis. 1915).
Sifficiency" of evidence may be considered by the court: Power Co.
v. Pillsbury, 149 Pac. 35 (Cal. 1915); Reek v. Whittlesberger. 148 N. W.
247 (Mich. 1914) ; Poccardi v. Pub. Ser. Comm., 84 S. E. 242 (W. Va. 1915) .
Hoenig v. Ind. Comm., i5o N. W. 996 (Wis. 1915).
'Borgnis v. Falk Co., T47 Wis. 327 (1911); Harvester Co. v. Ind. Comm.,
157 Wis. 167 (19T4).
'Appeal of Bond Co., 93 At. 245 (i915); Kennerson v. Thames Towboat
Co., 94 Atl. 372 (1915).
"Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 151 Pac. 398 (Cal. 1915); Powley
v. Vivian, i54 N. Y. Supp. 426 (1915); Northwestern Iron Co. v. Ind.
Comm., 154 Wis. 97 (1913).
" Reck v. Whittlesberger, 148 N. W. 247 (Mich. 1914); Voelz v. Ind.
Comm., 152 N. W. 83o (Wis. 1915). The admission of legally incompetent'
evidence in a proceeding before the board is no ground for reversal
of its award if there is any evidence upon which its finding could have
been made. Pigeon's Case, 216 Mass. 5I (1913); Fitzgerald v. Lozier
Motor Co., 154 N. W. 67 (Mich. I915); First National Bank v. Ind. Comm.,
154 N. W. 847' (Wis. 1915).
746 - .UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAIV REVIEW
of the court to weigh the evidence which has been introduced.12 In
New York the evidence taken before the commissioners may be
certified to the Appellate Division together with their findings of
fact, and is before the court to supplement and explain, but not to
contradict the commission's finding. 3
It is obviously improper that an administrative body should be
able to assume jurisdiction over persons or situations not contem-
plated to be within its purviews by the act which called the board
into being. Hence, the question of jurisdiction is always open to
the courts for review. The board cannot itself conclusively settle
that question and thus endow itself with power ;14 which is the law
of the principal case.
The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915 pro-
vides that the board's findings of fact shall in all cases be final, and
from any decision of the board on a question of law an appeal may
be taken to the courts.-- It would seem illogical to suppose that
this section were meant to include jurisdictional facts, and it remains
to be seen how far the courts will scan the evidence to determine
the legality of the board's findings.
T.L.H.
"Appeal of Bond Co., .supra, note 9; Grove v. Paper Co., i5x N. V.
554 (Mich. 1915); Spooner v. Detroit Co., 153 N. W. 657 (Mich. 1915);
Milwaukee Coke & Gas Co. v. Ind. Comm., i51 N. W. 245 (Wis. '915).
"In re Rheinwald, 153 N. Y. Supp. 598 (I915); Gleisner v. Gross, 1.55
N. Y. Supp. 946 (1915).
1" Power Co. v. Pillsbury, 149 Pac. 35 (Cal. 1915); In re Rheinwald,
153 N. Y. Supp. 598 (1915); Borgnis v. Falk, 147 Wis. 327 (I9i).
"Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 7,36, section 4o.'
